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DISCUSSION
MR. KAYNARD, MODERATOR: I knew that both John Sweeney
and Jay Siegel would be exciting speakers, but frankly, I never
thought that they would reach this height. I must commend both John
and Jay for a thoughtful and innovative approach to the need to
amend the National Labor Relations Act-although I am not sure
whether I have a job left. I am glad that this was the end of the session
rather than the beginning so that we have more time to go into greater
detail if anyone has questions that they wish to pose to the speakers.
AUDIENCE COMMENT: I would like either speaker to comment on
whether they think there would be any merit to either (1) increasing
the size of the Board, or (2) allowing the Board on a prospective basis
to adjust some of their self-imposed jurisdictional standards.
MR. SWEENEY: I would agree that the Board is understaffed and
that the delays can partially be attributed to the fact that the Board
needs additional funding and additional staff and that some attention
should probably be given to that.
MR. SIEGEL: I could not disagree more. When I was Chairman of
the American Bar Association Section on Labor and Employment
Law in the late seventies, we had before us at various times proposals
to enlarge the size of the Board from five to seven or nine. More Board
members are not what is needed. Enlarging the Board will create this
problem: The Board makes decisions, not on on the basis of its full five
members as a group, but rather through three-member panels. The
panels are drawn by the Executive Secretary's office, and this is done
in a rather arbitrary fashion. For example, when Collyer was a big
issue at the Board, the Executive Secretary would never put Fanning
and Jenkins, the two Board members who were opposed to Collyer,
on a panel with a single Board member who was in favor of Collyer.
To do so would have resulted in a panel decision of the Board overruling Collyer when three of the five members of the Board favored
Collyer. If you go to nine people, you will then have to have a whole
series of three-member panels. What are you going to do over problems of conflict with Board policy? You will have to, in effect, abandon the three-member panels, and go to a nine-member panel. If you
think it is tough getting case decisions out of five Board members, try
getting them out of nine. The alternative is what we have in the U.S.
Court of Appeals where there are nine judges, three-member panels
and en bane decisions when the panels come down with diametrically
opposed views.
So, I do not think the answer is adding more Board members. I once
proposed that if you are going to enlarge the Board, go to a sevenmember Board with two three-member panels and a non-voting
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chairman. And if you have a difference between the panels, you
resolve it then through the full complement of seven Board people. I
thought that was a compromise that might help. Today, I am not so
sure that even my own suggestion would make sense.
As to the second part of the question, the jurisdictional standards,
there were two Board members who believed that everything was
within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. The
problem was that the Board has entered many peripheral areas, such
as day care centers. That type of philosophical approach, that everything is subject to the Board's jurisdiction, has resulted in the Board
being overloaded with cases.
MR. KAYNARD, MODERATOR: I would point out that under section 14,1 the Board is locked into the current standards as of August
25, 1959, and in areas over which the Board had asserted jurisdiction
prior to that date, the Board cannot now relieve itself of jurisdiction. I
might also indicate that there is before the Board the question whether
the Board will modify National Transportation,2 which deals with the
question whether the Board should assert jurisdiction over "private
entities" that are intertwined with public entities. Having said that, I
think that Bruce Simon was making a point of personal privilege.
MR. SIMON: I was just going to suggest to Jay that if he is going to go
back to initial principles regarding the 1935 notion of what happens in
the bargaining room, that it is also rather inconsistent to say that only
when the union is successful is the Act working. There still remains
section 1 of the Act, which is a public policy declaration encouraging
collective bargaining. I would suggest that any fair reading of the Act
in its early history suggests that the statutory founding fathers, as it
were, did recognize an affirmative good in collective bargaining, and
an affirmative good in the institution of the exclusive collecting bargaining representative. That too is an initial principle that I suggest
we all go back to.
MR. SIEGEL: You are correct, Bruce, as far as you have gone. That
was the 1935 intention and declaration of policy. But in 1947, the
Congress added another statement to the declaration of policy indicating that the purpose of the Act was not just to encourage collective
bargaining, but also to encourage the right of employees to selfdetermination. That statement was added to the preamble in 1947 by
Senator Taft who was very much concerned that the statute was
becoming too one-sided. We can debate all we want, but Congress
wrote it into the statute. So, we have two principles, and all I am
1. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1976).
2. National Transp. Serv., Inc., 240 N.L.R.B. 565 (1979).
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suggesting is that we take the law as it presently exists and has existed
since 1947, a period of now thirty-five years, with both of those
fundamental principles. I did not say the Act does not work if the
union wins. I said the Act works whether the union wins or if the
union does not win, because the issue is not which side is victorious.
The issue under the Act is the employee's right of choice. Freedom of
choice is an issue that I think everybody understands very well today
in more contexts than this one.
MR. SIMON: Uncoerced by management action.
MR. SIEGEL: I have no problem with that, but as you know, it is
arguable whether it is coercion or a matter of free speech and persuasion. I can accept no coercion, but you have to agree that an employer
is entitled to present its position fully and completely to the employees. If the employer can lawfully persuade the employees that they
should reject the union and continue to deal directly with the employer, then (a) the Act has worked and nothing unlawful has happened, and (b) the employees have, in effect, expressed their desires,
not the employer's and not the union's. The problem is that the unions
are not able to persuade workers that they ought to be unionized.
Management has found that if it does its homework, treats its people
fairly and pays competitive wages and benefits, that the employees
will probably not be interested in unionizing. It is the employer who
gets himself or herself into trouble who finds that the employees want
to go union, and that is a failure of management. I can give you quote
after quote by international organizers who will tell you that they do
not organize, the employer organizes. The problem is that as the
unions continue to lose more and more elections, their frustration
builds up. The total level of unionized employees in the work force is
now down to about twenty percent and it has been dropping. I admit
that if I were a union organizer, a union lawyer, or the president of an
international union, I would be upset by that. I would say: "We are
slipping, we are losing our share of the market, something must be
wrong. Is our product out of date? Are we marketing it correctly?
What is wrong? Why are we losing?" It is to the credit of John
Sweeney that his people went out and negotiated an affiliation in
California and picked up almost 100,000 workers just like that, without a Board election and without any employer problems. He, at
least, has decided to change his product base and from a management
standpoint, that is the way to go.
MR. SWEENEY: I have been listening to this long enough. Nothing
that you can say shocks me, Jay. I just want to speak on behalf of our
own union, which was known as the Building Service Employees
International Union until the 1960's. In about 1964, our name was
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changed. We deleted the word "building" from the title and became
the Service Employees International Union. We were then a union of
about 250,000 members; we are a union today of 850,000 members.
And yes, we were successful in negotiating an affiliation for the
California state employees who had decided to go with an AFL-CIO
union. But our growth has been a very consistent growth through the
years in which the service sector of the economy has also been growing, and our expansion has been in the areas of health care and public
employment. And it has not been just through affiliation, although we
have been fortunate to have some affiliations. In the three years since
I have been President of the union, we have grown by 250,000 members. We have gone from about 600,000 up to the number that we are
at today. We are probably, together with the Teamsters, among the
most active participants at the National Labor Relations Board and
we have been winning a substantial number of our elections. We have
a pretty good track record on that and it is not just by affiliations. We
are organizing workers. We do not have the problems that some of our
basic industrial unions have for other reasons that are not associated
with the National Labor Relations Act or the National Labor Relations Board. And I do not think that you can say that we are in a time
of normalcy when people who have spent their professional careers
working for right-to-work committees, or who have had professional
background and expertise in union-busting consultant firms are being
appointed to the National Labor Relations Board. I do not think that
the Board can function as its creators intended with personnel and
with members who have that kind of background. Nor do I think that
any member of the Board or any employee of the Board should come
out of the labor movement. People like Sam Kaynard, who are career
employees of the Board, could very ably serve as Board members and
could bring great credit to that Board. I really think that the present
administration's actions and appointments have created the problems
that we now have. The employers are on the winning side, and
management controls the policies of the Board by the appointments
that have been made, to the detriment of working people who want to
organize and who want to have expedited means of representation.
Until the administration changes in Washington, the National Labor
Relations Act and the National Labor Relations Board is going to
continue to go downhill.
PROFESSOR SUMMERS: I think, Jay, you are oversimplifying a
number of things and disguising a number of things. When the National Labor Relations Act was passed in 1935, it reflected an affirmative policy to encourage and protect collective bargaining. And if one
reads the history of that time, there was an implicit assumption that
with such legal protection, employers would accept the process of
collective bargaining and that, after a period of transition, collective
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bargaining would become the natural, normal, accepted way of
handling employment relationships. In retrospect, that was gross optimism because employers never accepted collective bargaining. They
never recognized that unionization and the collective bargaining process was an advantageous way to run an enterprise. Now, I want to
point out one thing again, since you allude to comparative law, or
comparative labor situations. There is no western country, other than
the United States, in which employers do not accept and recognize
collective bargaining as the normal, natural and appropriate way of
doing things. The character of the operations used by American employers has no analog in Europe. If a Swedish employer behaved as
many American employers do, he would be considered a pariah and
would be effectively banned. One can explain this on the grounds that
unions are ninety percent organized in Sweden. But in Germany,
although unions account for only thirty-five to forty percent of the
workforce, ninety to ninety-five percent of all employees are covered
by collective bargaining because the employers accept collective bargaining. We are the only country in the world in which employers
engage in systematic anti-union persuasion or tactics. As Jay knows,
there are firms, including law firms and other consultant firms, that
go to the boundaries of the law, and in some cases beyond, to discourage people from joining unions. It seems to me a little strange that Jay
would go back and pick out one idea that was expressed by one side in
1935-to have no duty to bargain. What he envisions is a scenario in
which, that even though the union won, the employer could go into
the room and say to the union: "I don't give a damn what you say, I'm
not going to even listen," put up his feet on the table and read the
Wall Street Journal. That is what Jay proposes. We do not need a
duty to bargain if employers accept collective bargaining. But if they
do not, it seems to me that the only recourse a union would have
would to be to strike to compel the employer to talk. Now I will make
Jay a trade. I will surrender the legal duty to bargain if he wil
surrender the legal right of the employer to hire replacements in a
strike. No other country in the world recognizes that as a method of
doing business.
Strikers should not be replaced. If the majority of the union votes
for a strike, the enterprise should be closed. If Jay will accept that way
of conducting collective bargaining, we might accept his notion. But
the question is whether employers are going to continue their systematic and organizational opposition to the process of collective bargaining. There are employers who systematically violate the law. How in
the world can we have a system of collective bargaining in a society in
which employers year in and year out oppose that process?
MR. SIEGEL: I do not reject the principle of collective bargaining. If
the employees vote in a Board election that they want to be repre-
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sented by a union, and have their wages and terms and conditions of
employment set on a collective basis, I have no problem with that. I
have negotiated, as you know, several hundred contracts for clients
over the years. Half of my clients are organized employers, and we
come every two or three years to the table, sit down and negotiate
new agreements. Sometimes we cannot agree and we have a strike.
When the strike is over we go back and negotiate new contracts in
succeeding years. I have no problem with that and I am not suggesting that we do away with that process. What I am suggesting is that
the recommendations made by the Committee for Economic Development to get the Board out of the nit-picking monitoring of the bargaining process would in effect free up a lot of Board resources to deal
with the more vital issues, such as discharges and representation
elections, where there are many complaints about delay. I am suggesting that this is one limited way of doing it. With respect to your trade,
it would be like asking me to give you Wayne Gretzky for Barry Beck
of the New York Rangers. There is no comparison. The employees
have the right to strike. The employer has the right to continue to
operate, and whether you like it or not, our system favors the side
with the greater economic leverage. I was talking to John earlier
about a situation involving a strike by one of his locals against one of
my clients. When I came into the picture, we were really up against
the wall, and we paid through the nose to end that strike. The
leverage was on the union's side. At that point, being a realist, I sat
down and negotiated the best deal out I could for my client. I also had
to get Sam Kaynard's people off my back because the Board was in on
it, and I did the best I could to get that situation restored to some
condition of normalcy. I had no problem with that and I did not
complain that we were abused or anything of that kind. The system is
that the side with the economic leverage is going to win out. Did you
see the picture of the 2,500 people waiting to sign up with McDonnell
Douglas the other day for jobs? There are people out there that want
to go to work and they do not care that a union is on strike; they want
jobs, and that is what gives the employer leverage today. That is why
Greyhound was able to operate as it did and force the union to take
concessions. Yet, when I started in this business in the fifties and
sixties, the unions had the economic leverage and we paid some pretty
high and fancy settlements. The settlements were high because management did not have the economic leverage to tell the unions no, and
shut down the auto or steel industry. The result today is that the price
of labor is so high in the basic industries that we have a very serious
economic crisis in this country. Now, maybe that is an argument for
changing the system, but that is the system we have in the law, and
that is the system we have to live by, for better or for worse. I get
upset at people who complain that the system is against them because
the results are going against them. You have to take the bad with the
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good. And in the non-basic industries, there are peaks and valleys,
cyclical changes in economic leverage and in the power struggle. I
agree that it is very different from Europe. Look at England, where
the unions had all of the leverage, and look at the position of their
economy today. The Swedish example is no bargain; they have had
many problems over there. The Danes have had trouble, and in fact,
all the European countries have had trouble. The question is whether
our system is basically working over the long term? My answer is: I
think it is.
PROFESSOR SUMMERS: I think what Jay has said obfuscates the
problem. It is true that collective bargaining is based upon relative
economic force, and that I accept. But what defines the permissible
uses of economic force is not economy-it is law. It is the legal right of
the employer to hire replacements that enables Greyhound to win. If
the legal rule were different, the economic outcome would be different. When the Taft-Hartley Act was passed, it was intended to make
boycotts illegal and thereby deprive the unions of one of their weapons
in the economic contest. The decision that allows the employer to
lock-out is a legal rule that defines the economic force. It is nonsense
to talk about balance of economic force without asking what legal
rules define that force. What is troublesome is that we have constructed a web of legal rules that work to the disadvantage of the
unions and to the advantage of the employer in breaking strikes, in
reducing organizations and in the whole bargaining process. It seems
to me that the issue today is whether to amend the Taft-Hartley Act,
and what I am suggesting here is that we ought to think of amendments that go to the question of the use of economic position, so that
we have a comprehensive system of collective bargaining. Unlike Jay,
I am not neutral as to whether we should have a system of collective
bargaining. I think we ought to have a comprehensive system of
collective bargaining and I think the law ought to be constructed to
encourage and protect that process. That is where the difference lies,
and it will not be disguised by saying that it is a question of balance of
economic force. It is a question of law.
MR. KAYNARD, MODERATOR: Well, I am sure that we could
continue this dialogue indefinitely. John and Jay, on behalf of all
those present, let me again thank you both for a thought-provoking
and exciting presentation and exchange.

